- Mihnea Capraru
- Majid D. Beni
- Vladimir Krstic
- Mirko Farina
- Sydney Morrow
- Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen
- Shane Ryan
- Siegfried Van Duffel
Mihnea Capraru is an assistant professor of philosophy at Nazarbayev University, having received his PhD from Syracuse University in 2015. His research is in philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, and philosophy of cognitive science, while his teaching interests also encompass logic, metaphysics (including action theory), and general philosophy of science.
“Note on the individuation of biological traits”
Journal of Philosophy, 115:215–221, 2018
“Objective truth in matters of taste”
Philosophical Studies, 173:1755–1777, 2016
“A counterexample to variabilism”
Analysis, 76:26–29, 2016
“Stained glass as a model for consciousness”
Philosophical Explorations, 18:90–103, 2015
“A new source of data about singular thought”
Philosophia, 41:1159–1172, 2013
Courses taught at Nazarbayev University
- PHIL 360 Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence
- PHIL 342 Philosophy of Biology
- PHIL 240 Formal Logic
- PHIL 223 Philosophy of Science
- PHIL 124 Knowledge and Reality
Majid D. Beni
Majid D. Beni (aka Davoody Beni) is presently serving as an instructor in the Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies at Nazarbayev University. He is a philosopher of science and cognitive science, and also dabbles in ethics and epistemology from time to time. He received his PhD from IRIP, Tehran. He wrote my thesis on the history of philosophy of science in the early 20th century under the supervision of Rick Creath at the SoLS at ASU (he a visiting scholar there when I was doing my PhD).
Majid is currently working on two interconnected projects:
Cognitive Structural Realism (CSR): a new cognitive version of Structural Realism.
Structural Realist theory of the Self: Majid has developed this theory in quite a few journals, e.g., Synthese, Journal of Consciousness Studies, etc., and in a new book, Structuring the Self, which will be published with Palgrave Macmillan around December. Personal website: https://sites.google.com/site/majiddavoodybeni/home
Beni, Majid Davoody. (2019). Cognitive Structural Realism, forthcoming, Springer, Studies in Brain and Mind Series
———. Structuring the Self, forthcoming (December 2019). Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science
Beni, Majid Davoody. 2015a. “Structural Realism without Metaphysics: Notes on Carnap’s Measured Pragmatic Structural Realism.” Organon F 22 (2015): 302–24.
———. 2015b. “On Logic, Syntax, and Silence.” Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 42 (1): 195–209. doi:10.1515/slgr-2015-0037.
———. 2016a. “Epistemic Informational Structural Realism.” Minds and Machines 26 (4). Springer Netherlands: 323–39. doi:10.1007/s11023-016-9403-4.
———. 2016b. “Structural Realist Account of the Self.” Synthese 193 (12). Springer Netherlands: 3727–40. doi:10.1007/s11229-016-1098-9.
———. 2017b. “The Code Model of Biosemiotics and the Fate of the Structuralist Theory of Mental Representation.” Biosemiotics 10 (1). Springer Netherlands: 99–107. doi:10.1007/s12304-016-9280-5.
———. 2017c. “On the Thinking Brains and Tinkering with the Scientific Models.” Axiomathes, March. Springer Netherlands, 1–15. doi:10.1007/s10516-017-9334-6.
———. 2017d. “Reconstructing the upward path to structural realism.” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 7(3), 393–409. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-016-0167-8
———. 2017e. “The Downward Path to Epistemic Informational Structural Realism.” Acta Analytica, October. Springer Netherlands, 1–17. doi:10.1007/s12136-017-0333-4.
———. 2017f. “Structural Realism, Metaphysical Unification, and the Ontology and Epistemology of Patterns.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31 (3): 285–300. doi:10.1080/02698595.2018.1463691.
———. 2018a. “Commentary: The Predictive Processing Paradigm Has Roots in Kant.” Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience 11. Frontiers: 98. doi:10.3389/FNSYS.2017.00098.
———. 2018b. “The reward of unification: A realist reading of the predictive processing theory”. New Ideas in Psychology, 48, 21–26. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2017.10.001
———. 2018c. “Much Ado about Nothing: Toward a structural realist theory of intentionality”. Axiomathes, March. Springer Netherlands, 1–16. doi:10.1007/s10516-018-9372-8.
———. 2018d. “Syntactical Informational Structural Realism.” Minds and Machines. Springer Netherlands, 1–21.
———. 2018e. “An Outline of a Unified Theory of the Relational Self: Grounding the Self in the Manifold of Interpersonal Relations.” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1–19.
———. 2018f. “A Structuralist Defence of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 25(9–10), 75-89.
———. 2018g. “Reconstructing Probabilistic Realism: Re-Enacting Syntactical Structures.” Journal for General Philosophy of Science. Springer Netherlands, 1–21. . doi:10.1007/s10838-018-9426-z.
———. 2019, “New Mechanistic Philosophy and the Scientific Prospects of Code Biology.” Biosemiotics 1-15. doi: 10.1007/s12304-019-09360-0
———. Forthcoming, “On the Origin of Mental Representations.” Biosystems, https://doi.org/10.1016/J.BIOSYSTEMS.2019.103995.
———. Forthcoming, “Conjuring Cognitive Structures: Towards a Unified Model of Cognition” in Matthieu Fontaine (ed.), MODEL-BASED REASONING in SCIENCE and TECHNOLOGY, Springer
———. Forthcoming, “On the Underpinning Mechanisms of (Epistemically) Reliable Processes”, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism.
Vladimir Krstic finished his PhD in Philosophy at the University of Auckland under the supervision of John Bishop and Fred Kroon. Jordi Fernández (University of Adelaide) and Andy Egan (Rutgers) examined his dissertation.
Before Auckland and Nur-Sultan, he lived in Belgrade, Serbia. He has an Honours degree in Theology from the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Theology, and an MA in Philosophy from the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Philosophy.
His current research lies at the intersection of philosophy of mind, cognitive science (experimental philosophy), philosophy of language, and philosophy of deception. He proposes and defends novel theories of lying (the ‘Violation’ account) and deception (the ‘Manipulativist’ view) that, he argues, not only explain general instances of lying and deception better than their rivals but also generate a much less problematic theory of self-deception.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, forthcoming
“Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?”
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 100:642-660, 2019
(with Chantelle Saville) “Deception as a Kind of Manipulation”
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97:830-835, 2019
Ratio, 31:312-320, 2018
visiting assistant professor
Mirko Farina is an Assistant Professor in the Department of History, Philosophy, and Religious Studies at Nazarbayev University.
Between 2016-2019 he was a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of Philosophy at King’s College London (under David Papineau). He was also visiting scholar (Feb 2017) in the School of Philosophy at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) in Moscow.
Mirko pursued his Doctoral Studies in the Department of Cognitive Science at Macquarie University (Sydney) under the supervision of John Sutton (primary supervisor). He also holds an MPhil in Philosophy of Mind from the University of Edinburgh where he was supervised by Andy Clark, and an MRes in Logic and Philosophy of Science from the University of Milan (Erasmus at UvA Amsterdam) – where he was supervised by Corrado Sinigaglia.
During his PhD he was a visiting fellow at Aarhus University (under Andreas Roepstorff), and at The Center for Mind, Brain, Behaviour, and Cognitive Evolution – Ruhr University Bochum – (under Tobias Schlicht).
His academic interests fall at the confluence of non-Cartesian cognitive science, philosophy of mind, cultural psychology, developmental neuroscience, philosophy of science, and philosophy of perception. Specifically, his research to date falls into five main areas, all of live interest in philosophy of mind and cognition:
(i) multisensory perception and the senses;
(ii) embodied and situated cognition;
(iii) cultural learning and evolution of cognition;
(iv) sport psychology;
(v) free will.
For more specific information about his research and grants, please see: https://mirkofarina.weebly.com/research.html and https://mirkofarina.weebly.com/grants-and-awards.html.
Courses offered at NU
- Critical Thinking PHI141
- Knowledge and Reality PHI124
1. Farina, M. (2017). ‘Neural Plasticity: Don’t Fall for the Hype!’. British Academy Review, 30, pp. 54-56
2. Farina, M. (2016). ‘Three Approaches to Human Cognitive Development: Neo-Nativism, Neuroconstructivism, and Dynamic Enskilment”. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 67, 2, pp. 617-641. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axu026
3. Farina, M. (2013). ‘Neither Touch nor Vision: sensory substitution as artificial synaesthesia?’. Biology and Philosophy, Vol. 28, Issue 4, pp. 639-655.
4. Farina, M., & Cei, A. (2019). ‘Concentration and Self-Talk in Football’. In: Konter, E. Beckmann, J. , & Loughead, T . (Eds.), Football Psychology: From Theory to Practice. (pp.241-254). London, UK: Routledge.
5. Farina, M. & Cei, A. (2018). “Neither genes nor deliberate practice: an embodied and multidimensional approach to talent”. In: Cappuccio, M. (Ed.), The Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology, (pp.303-332), MIT Press.
6. Auvray, M., & Farina, M. (the two authors made equal contributions – alphabetical order followed in the citation). (2017). “Patrolling the boundaries of synaesthesia: a critical appraisal of transient and artificially-acquired forms of synaesthetic experiences”. In Deroy O. (Ed.). Sensory Blending: On Synaesthesia and Related Phenomena, (pp.248-274). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
7.Farina, M., (2016). “Culture and Cognition. Oxford Bibliographies Online, Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195396577-0324
8. Kiverstein, J., Farina, M., & Clark, A. (2015). “Substituting the Senses”. In M. Matthen (Ed.). The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, (pp.659-678), Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
9. Kiverstein, J., Farina, M., & Clark, A. (2013): “The Extended Mind”, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.http://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/view/document/obo-9780195396577/obo-9780195396577-0099.xml
10. Farina, M. (2019). Critical Notice of Sensory Substitution and Augmentation. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews . https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/sensory-substitution-and-augmentation/
Sydney Morrow received her Ph.D. from the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa in Spring 2018. Her dissertation is titled “A Comparative Study of ‘Existential Destitution’ in Pre-Qin Chinese Philosophy and Karl Jaspers in the Context of Homelessness in Hawaiʻi”. In it, she uses a comparative approach to formulate a methodology and application of place-based philosophy. Drawing from resources in classical and modern Chinese philosophy, she draws out themes related to hardship, dire circumstances, and personal cultivation in the face of each. She believes that philosophy ought to be concerned with contemporary problems, and that analysis of these pressing issues is best done in contextualized and localized ways.
Her research interests include Pre-Qin and Han Chinese Philosophy, 20th Century Chinese Philosophy, 20th Century European Existentialism, Environmental and Agricultural Ethics, Applied and Place-based Philosophy, Comparative and Cross-Cultural Philosophy, and Homelessness Studies.
Her current writing projects include:
- “Engaging Fei Xiaotong’s Societal Inclusivity in an Age of Isolationism”
- “Penniless but not Poor: Forming a Theory of Existential Poverty Using Resources from Classical Chinese Philosophy and Simone Weil”
- “Exhausting Future Possibilities: The Liberated Philosophy of Jin Yuelin and Engagement in Preferred Futures”
Teaching Interests include Daoism, Confucianism, Chinese Philosophies of War, and the Philosophical Roots of Martial Arts Practice.
Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen is a philosopher of science, logic, language and human thought. He moved to Astana from Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn, Estonia, where he was professor of philosophy and professor of semiotics for a number of years. He has also had visiting positions at universities in China and Korea.
Ahti’s research interests span from scientific method to human mind and their histories. Methods of philosophy and analysis can help us discover new and unforeseen aspects of how we reason, how the world works, and what makes everything to be the way it is. These methods themselves have to be discovered and developed. That is where the stuff we call logic comes in.
C. S. Peirce once wrote that “The world hates sound reasoning as a child hates medicine” (1910). There is still much work to be done to have the world reason in a good way. This task is shared by science, philosophy, and liberal arts education at all levels. And it is the task Ahti is committed to.
Currently he is completing a large edition on Peirce’s unpublished writings on his theory of existential graphs (Logic of the Future).
(with D. Chiffi) Assertive and Existential Graphs: A Comparison, in Diagrammatic Representation and Inference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, in press.
(with Ma M.) A Weakening of Alpha Graphs: Quasi-Boolean Algebras, in Diagrammatic Representation and Inference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer, in press.
(with D. Chiffi) Abductive Inference within a Pragmatic Framework, Synthese, in press.
(with Ma M.) A Graphical Calculus for Intuitionistic Logic, Logique & Analyse, in press.
Ma, M. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (in press). Let us investigate! Dynamic Conjecture-Making as the Formal Logic of Abduction, Journal of Philosophical Logic, in press.
Bellucci, F., Moktefi, A., and Pietarinen, A.-V. (in press). Simplex sigillum veri: Peano, Frege, and Peirce on the Primitives of Logic, History and Philosophy of Logic, in press.
Pietarinen, A.-V. & Bellucci, F. (in press). Assertion and Denial: A Contribution from Logical Notations, Journal of Applied Logics, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jal.2017.01.001.
Ma, M. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (in press). Gamma Graph Calculi for Modal Logics, Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1390-3.
Chiffi, D. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (in press). Fundamental Uncertainty and Values, Philosophia, in press. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-017-9865-5
Ma, M. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2017). Proof Analysis of Peirce’s Alpha System of Graphs, Studia Logica 105(3), 625-647. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11225-016-9703-y
Pietarinen, A.-V. (2017). Is There a General Diagram Concept?, in S. Krämer & C. Ljundberg (eds.), Thinking with Diagrams: The Semiotic Basis of Human Cognition, Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 121-138.
Ma, M. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2017). Graphical Sequent Calculi for Modal Logics, The 9th Workshop on Methods for Modalities, Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 243, 91-103.
Ma, M. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2017). Peirce’s Sequent Proofs of Distributivity, Logic and Its Applications: 7th Indian Conference, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10119, Springer, 168-182.
Bellucci, F. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016). From Mitchell to Carus: Fourteen Years of Logical Graphs in the Making, Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 52(4), 539-575. DOI: 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.52.4.02
Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016). Extensions of Euler Diagrams in Peirce’s Four Manuscripts on Logical Graphs, in Jamnik, M. et al. (eds.), Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 9781, 139-154.
Pietarinen, A.-V. & Bellucci, F. (2016). Two Dogmas of Diagrammatic Reasoning: A View from Existential Graphs, in K. Hull & R. Atkins (eds.), Peirce on Perception and Reasoning: From Icons to Logic, Routledge, 174-195.
Bellucci, F. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016). Existential Graphs as an Instrument for Logical Analysis. Part 1: Alpha, Review of Symbolic Logic 9, 209-237.
Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016). Answers to Philosophy of Logic: 5 Questions, in Lupher, T. & Adajian, T. (eds.), Philosophy of Logic: 5 Questions, Automatic Press/VIP, 139-152.
Moktefi, A. & Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016). On the Diagrammatic Representation of Existential Statements with Venn and Euler Diagrams, Journal of Logic, Language, and Information 24, 361-374.
Pietarinen, A.-V. & Bellucci, F. (2016). H. Paul Grice’s Lecture Notes on Charles S. Peirce’s Theory of Signs, International Review of Pragmatics 8(1), 82-129.
Pietarinen, A.-V. (2016). Exploring the Beta Quadrant, Synthese 192, 941-970. DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0677-5.
I was awarded my PhD from the University of Edinburgh. My PhD thesis concerns the nature and value of knowledge and the epistemic environment. The thesis was supervised by Professor Duncan Pritchard FRSE and Professor Jesper Kallestrup and examined by Professor John Greco.
The concern of my research is the conduciveness of our physical and social environment to our attainment of valuable epistemic goods such as intellectual virtues, knowledge, and wisdom. My purpose is not only to make assessments of that environment, our epistemic environment, but rather to propose ways in which our epistemic environment might be protected and improved. I call this epistemic environmentalism. Recent political and cultural developments, such as the increased consciousness of fake news and its negative effects on political discourse, seem to underscore the importance of this project.
My project grew out of recent work on the value of knowledge, often regarded by epistemologists as an especially valuable epistemic good. My own research on the topic, “Why Knowledge is Special”, was published in Philosophy in the first half of 2017. The paper examines the presentation of the topic by Socrates in the Meno and considers Greco’s virtue epistemological approach before making the case for my own approach. My approach emphasises the value of goods, like knowledge, for which virtue is necessary but not sufficient.
While having an account of the value of knowledge, as well as other epistemic goods, is important for epistemic environmentalism, because of the applied nature of the project, the project is not purely epistemological. It is necessary to make the case for the appropriateness of actors like the state playing a role in the epistemic environment. This has led me to undertake research into justificatory frameworks for the sort of interventions that the epistemic environmentalist may envisage for the sake of a good epistemic environment. In particular I have focused my attention on paternalism. This focus has resulted in the publication of two articles in leading philosophical journals in two years. “Paternalism: An Analysis” in Utilitas provides an analysis of the paternalist act, while “Libertarian Paternalism is Hard Paternalism” in Analysis builds on that analysis to make the case that libertarian paternalism or nudging, recently popular with policy makers, is in fact a form of hard paternalism. My paper also proposes a reformed libertarian paternalism that wouldn’t qualify as hard paternalism and would so avoid the criticisms hard paternalism faces.
At the end of 2017 my paper “Epistemic Environmentalism”, which provides an account of my applied epistemological framework, was accepted for publication by the Journal of Philosophical Research. This paper examines the nature of the epistemic environment and the role epistemic value theory and social epistemology play in informing and motivating epistemic environmentalism. “Epistemic Environmentalism” also considers a form of state supported sanction against dishonest testifiers occupying positions of sensitivity, such as media and experts, in the epistemic environment. In the last year, I’ve presented different aspects of epistemic environmentalism at the Trust, Expert Opinion and Policy Conference at University College Dublin and at the Budapest Workshop on Philosophy of Technology at the Budapest University of Technology and Economics. In the next year I aim to complete a draft of my book on Epistemic Environmentalism.
“Libertarian Paternalism is Hard Paternalism”, Analysis, forthcoming.
“Trust”, in Think, forthcoming.
“Why Knowledge is Special”, in Philosophy, 92(2), 249-269, 2017.
“Paternalism: An Analysis”, in Utilitas 28(02), 123-135, 2016.
“Wisdom: Understanding and the Good Life”, in Acta Analytica 31(3), 235-251, 2016.
“Real-Time Democracy”, in The International Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(2), 301-312, 2016.
“Reflection as a Master Virtue”, co-authored with Chienkuo Mi, for a special issue of Synthese. (Published on journal website in 2016. Not yet available in print).
“Standard Gettier Cases: A Problem for Greco?”, in Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 90, 201-212, 2014.
“A Humean Account of Testimonial Justification”, in Logos and Episteme, vol. 5 (2), 209-219, 2014.
“Zagzebski on Rationality”, co-authored with Duncan Pritchard, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion (invited symposium on Zagzebski’s Epistemic Authority), 6, 39-46, 2014.
- PHIL 325 Truth, Lies, Media, and Propaganda
- PHIL 220 Truth, Knowledge, and Belief
- PHIL 215 Bioethics
- PHIL 110 The Good Life in Practice
Siegfried Van Duffel
Siegfried Van Duffel was trained as a philosopher and completed a Ph.D. in law at Ghent University (Belgium). Before coming to Nazarbayev University, he taught ethics and Political Theory at the University of Groningen (the Netherlands) and the University of Hong Kong. He also held post-doc positions at the National University of Singapore and the Center of Excellence in Philosophical Psychology, Morality and Politics of the University of Helsinki and was visiting associate professor at Huafan University and National Taiwan University.
Siegfried’s main research interest is cultural differences, which is why he felt it necessary to leave Europe and continue living and working in a non-Western society. His current project is to complete a book on human rights and cultural differences. The aim of this book is to describe human rights theories as an aspect of the culture in which they were developed. He also hopes to do comparative empirical research on intuitions related to human rights. His work was published in international peer-reviewed journals such as The Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, The Journal of Political Philosophy, The Monist, and The European Journal of Philosophy.
“Human Rights.” In Andrew Fiala (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy, pp. 641-664. London: Bloomsbury, 2015.
“Conciliarism.” In Michael T. Gibbons, et al. (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Political Thought. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
“Natural Rights to Welfare.” European Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 21(4), 2013, pp. 641-664.
“Moral Philosophy.” In Dinah Shelton (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Human Rights Law, pp. 32-53. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013
“In Defence of the Will Theory of Rights.” Res Publica, Vol. 18, Issue 4 (2012), pp. 321–331.
“The Nature of Rights Debate Rests on a Mistake.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 93, Issue 2 (2012), pp. 104-123. • Reprint in Horacio Spector and Brian Bix (eds), Rights: Concepts and Contexts. Ashgate, 2012.
“Distributive Justice Before the Eighteenth Century.” History of Political Thought Vol. 32, Issue 3 (2011), pp. 449-64. (with Dennis Yap)
“From Objective Right to Subjective Rights: The Franciscans and the Will and Interest Conceptions of Rights.” In Virpi Mäkinen (ed), The Nature of Rights: Moral and Political Aspects of Right(s) in Late-Medieval and Early-Modern Philosophy, pp. 65-93. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 2010.
“The Dependence of Libertarianism on the Notion of Sovereignty.” Critical Review Vol. 21, Issue 1. (2009) pp. 117-124.
“Een kritische inleiding tot libertarisme.” Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte Vol. 99 Issue 1. (2007), pp. 53-66. [in Dutch]
“Sovereignty as a Religious Concept.” The Monist Vol. 91, Issue 1. (2007) pp. 126-143.
“Natural Rights and Individual Sovereignty.” Journal of Political Philosophy Vol. 12, Issue 2 (June 2004), pp. 147-162.
“Libertarian Natural Rights.” Critical Review Vol. 16, Issue 4 (winter 2004), pp. 353-375.
“How to Study Human Rights and Culture (Without Becoming a Relativist).” Philosophy in the Contemporary World Vol. 11, Issue 2 (autumn-winter 2004), pp. 1-6.
“A Plea for Theory in Rethinking Human Rights.” International Legal Theory Vol. 9, Issue 1 (Fall 2003), pp. 135 165.
Siegfried has comprehensive experience in teaching political theory, (including the history of western political thought) and ethics (normative and applied ethics, as well as the history of ethics). He has also taught comparative science of religion, post-colonial studies. His other teaching interests are cultural psychology, philosophy of action, and comparative science of cultures.
List of Courses Taught at NU
- Global Justice
- Human Rights and Cultural Differences
- Social Contract Theory (Hobbes to Kant)
- Introduction to Political Theory
- Freshman seminar